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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

May the Plaintiff/Appellant claim reversible error based

upon her assertion that the Findings of Fact which she drafted for
the court's signature are inadequate?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its judicial and statutory

discretion

in not making

its

increased

child

support award

retroactive?
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant/Respondent, Dr. Brown, seeks affirmance of the
trial court's Order on plaintiff's Petition for Modification and
on defendant's Counter Petition for Modification in all respects
and for an award of costs incurred by him in connection with
responding to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter involves a divorce action. The Decree was entered
in February 1980.

In March of 1983, Mrs. Brown filed a Petition

to Modify the Decree seeking increases in alimony and child
support. Dr. Brown counter-petitioned seeking a termination of the
original alimony award. The Petitions were set for trial in August
1984.

A settlement of the issues was agreed to by the parties in

June of 1984 at a deposition prior to trial.

Five months later,

Mrs. Brown elected not to comply with the agreement and Dr. Brown
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sought to enforce it.

The trial court, after a hearing, elected

to enforce it. Mrs. Brown appealed that decision. This Court, in
the case of Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987) (a copy
of which is included in the Addendum to this Brief) reversed the
trial court and set aside the settlement agreement and directed
that a trial be held in connection with both Petitions.

In

October, 1988, that trial was held. In a Memorandum Decision, the
trial court, among other things, increased the original child
support award and did not make the increased award retroactive and
did not grant Dr. Brown's request to terminate alimony.

At the

direction of the Court, Mrs. Brown's counsel prepared Findings,
Conclusions and an Order which were approved by Dr. Brown's counsel
(A copy has been included in the Addendum to this Brief) . No post
trial motions were filed by either side.

Mrs. Brown has now

appealed the issue of retroactive application of child support only
to this Court.

Dr. Brown has not cross-appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mrs. Brown's brief does not contain a Statement of Facts as
is required by Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Therefore, in order for this Court to have the facts before it
sufficient to address the issue raised by Mrs. Brown, Dr. Brown
submits the following Statement of Facts related to the original
divorce action, the subsequent modification and the appeals which
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have followed.
Dr. and Mrs. Brown were married for ten years (R. 11) . At the
time of the divorce, they had three children ages 9, 6 & 3 (R. 12) .
Mrs. Brown was awarded custody of the children (R. 19) .

The

original Decree of Divorce required Dr. Brown to pay $900.00 per
month alimony terminating upon the appellant's remarriage or
cohabitation (R. 21) .

Dr. Brown also was ordered to pay child

support of $300.00 per month, per child until each child reached
age 18 or married.

If any of the children chose to attend college

or serve on an LDS mission, child support for that child would
continue until age 21 (R. 20-21).
At all time material to this action, Dr. Brown has made all
required alimony and child support payments in a timely manner (Tr.
133-134).
In March 1983, Mrs. Brown sought modification of the original
Decree seeking in part increased alimony to $1,500.00 per month and
increased child support to $500.00 per month, per child (R. 29).
Respondent

counter-petitioned

seeking

an

expansion

of

his

visitation and termination of alimony (R. 37). The parties began
preparing for trial on the modification issues by conducting
extensive discovery.

A final trial date was set for August 14,

1984 (R. 148). Respondent had scheduled appellant's deposition for
June 4, 1984. Just prior to that time, the parties had exchanged
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proposals for settlement.

At the deposition, they agreed to a

settlement of all issues and put the Settlement Agreement on the
record with the understanding that it would later be reduced to
writing.

Counsel for respondent then reduced the Agreement to

writing and was sent it to appellant's counsel for signature.
Based upon that, the August trial date was stricken.

Beginning

immediately in July, Dr. Brown began to make the increased payments
to Mrs. Brown as required was required by the Stipulation that he
assumed was binding upon him.

Mrs. Brown accepted these payments

without comment, however, five months after her counsel withdrew,
she communicated to her new attorney that she did not feel bound
by the Stipulation.

Respondent thereafter filed a Motion and was

granted an order enforcing the June 4, Settlement Agreement (R.
160-165, 191-198).
Mrs. Brown appealed that decision to the Utah Supreme Court
in August 1985.
Court.

This case was subsequently transferred to this

In October of

1987, this Court

issued

its opinion

determining that the June 1984 Stipulation was invalid and remanded
the entire back to the trial court for a full hearing on both
Petitions (See Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987).
A

one-day

trial,

was

conducted

on

October

18, 1988.

Documentary evidence and testimony was presented by both sides in
support of their respective Petitions.
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Dr. Brown testified that he had faithfully paid his child
support and alimony as was required by several different agreements
he presumed were binding on him over the course of almost nine
years the parties had been divorced (Tr. 134) .

At the time of

trial, he had paid $95,400.00 in alimony over nine years (Tr. 132) .
He also had paid the increased child support called for under the
June 1984, stipulation, for the first five months of increased
support until Mrs. Brown stated she would not abide by the
Agreement (Tr. 117).
In addition, for 11 months during 1987, the parties1 oldest
daughter, Charisse, lived with Dr. Brown in his home (Tr. 134) .
For the first eight months of that time he continued to pay full
child support to Mrs. Brown. After eight months, a Stipulation was
entered into allowing Dr. Brown to pay half of the support for
Charisse while she resided with him (Tr. 116).
At the time of trial, Dr. Brown had remarried and had two
additional children from that marriage (Tr. 13). In addition, he
was working 80-90 hours per week to maintain the income level which
was presented to the Court (Tr. 129).
After both sides had presented their evidence, the trial court
took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued its
Memorandum Decision. In that decision, the trail court found that
Mrs. Brown's income had increased from zero to $14,000.00 annually
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and Dr. Brown's income had increased from $70,000.00 per year to
$100,000.00 plus per year (R. 370-371).

Based upon that change of

circumstances, it ordered the following:
(a) The defendant was to continue to pay the
$900.00 per month alimony award until such time
as the youngest child of the parties reached
the age of majority.
(b) It increased the defendant's child support
obligation from $300.00 per month to $500.00
per month per child keeping the original
provision in the Decree that child support
would continue to the age of 21 years if that
child elected to serve a mission for the LDS
Church or attend a college or university.
(c) It denied plaintiff's request that the
increased child support award be made
retroactive to the date of the filing of her
Petition for Modification.
(d) It awarded Mrs. Brown $5,000.00 toward her
attorney's fees.
(e) It gave Dr. Brown six
visitation with the children.

weeks

summer

(R. 370-373)
The trial court then directed Mrs. Brown's counsel to prepare
appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of
Modification reflecting the decision of the Court (R. 373). The
Findings so prepared by Mrs. Brown's counsel were approved by Dr.
Brown's counsel

(R. 391).

Neither side filed any post-trial

motions. Mrs. Brown then filed a timely Notice of Appeal appealing
only the trial court's decision not to make the increased child
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support award retroactive (R. 393) .

Dr. Brown did not file a

cross-appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
Mrs. Brown claims that the Findings of Fact signed by the
trial court were inadequate and the matter should be remanded for
entry of additional Findings. Mrs. Brown's counsel prepared those
Findings of Fact and, consequently, she cannot now attempt to seek
a reversal on the grounds that those Findings are inadequate.
Under this Court's holding of Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah
App. 1987) and the Utah Supreme Court's holding of Jones v. Jones,
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
POINT II
The trial court's decision not to make the increased child
support award retroactive to the date Mrs. Brown's Petition for
Modification was filed was a matter within the sound discretion
afforded the trial court.

That discretion as it relates to this

particular issue is supported not only by judicial authority as
established by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals, but also statutorily as established by the Utah State
Legislature.
Further, the statute upon which Mrs. Brown relies,
not only makes retroactive application of increased support awards
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discretionary with the Court, but also was not enacted until April
of 1987, and, therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply the
provisions of that statute related to retroactive application to
the facts of this case,
POINT III
Evidence on the issue of retroactive application of increased
child support was presented to the trial court by both sides.
Likewise, each side presented legal arguments and legal memorandum
related to that request. The trial court considered that evidence
as well as those legal arguments in connection with fashioning an
overall remedy which would be fair to both parties under the
circumstances of this particular case.

Any attempt to adjust or

change one particular aspect of the trial court"s decision when
that decision was based upon numerous factors, all of which are
interrelated, would require adjustment of all the others in order
to maintain an equitable result. Mrs. Brown has not shown that the
trial court abused its discretion in deciding not to make the award
retroactive.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE MRS. BROWN PREPARED THE FINAL
FINDINGS AND ORDER FROM WHICH SHE IS
NOW APPEALING, SHE IS PRECLUDED FROM
NOW CLAIMING THAT THOSE FINDINGS ON
THE ISSUE OF THE RETROACTIVITY OF THE
INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT AWARD ARE
INADEQUATE.
8

In Point I of her brief, Mrs. Brown claims that the trial
court committed reversible error because it failed to make a
specific finding on her request that any increased
award be made retroactive.

child support

This claim of error is without merit

and should be denied. First, the issue of retroactive application
of any increased child support award was requested in Mrs. Brown's
original Petition to Modify (R. 29) and was thoroughly briefed by
both Mrs. and Dr. Brown at the time of trial (R. 352-369, 374-385).
Likewise,

substantial

evidence

was

presented

by

both

sides

regarding the overall fairness of granting or not granting Mrs.
Brown's request for retroactive application and both parties'
counsel argued their respective positions on that issue to the
trial court during closing arguments (Tr. Vol. 2, pgs. 4, 5, 9,
10) .
Following all of that, the trial court then filed a Memorandum
Decision, paragraph 3 of which stated:
Plaintiff's petition for increased child
support retroactive to the date of filing her
petition is denied. . . . Plaintiff's counsel
is requested to prepare and submit the
appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Otder of Modification as indicated
above. (R. 372)
While Point I of Appellant's Brief cites various facts,
figures and calculations which attempt to support her claim of
inadequate Findings, those facts and figure become immaterial to
9

the basic issue which has been raised on appeal —

were the

Findings adequate and, if not, can the person who prepared the
Findings rely on any claimed inadequacies in an attempt to reverse
a trial court's decision?
Mrs. Brown's counsel was directed to prepare appropriate
Findings and Conclusions and an Order. Mrs. Brown did not request
additional Findings, did not make a motion for new trial or did not
seek clarification from the trial court relative to its denial of
retroactive application. Rather, Mrs. Brown's counsel prepared the
Findings from which she now seeks relief.
Under Utah law, when a party prepares Findings for signature
by the Court, that party cannot afterwards claim reversible error
based upon a claim of inadequacy of the Findings so prepared. That
law is clearly and succinctly set forth in the recent decision of
this Court in the case of Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App.
1987) . Judge Greenwood, writing for a unanimous panel, cited with
approval the Utah Supreme Court case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072 (Utah 1985), and stated:
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985),
appellant claimed that the trial court had
improperly distributed property.
The Utah
Supreme Court stated that findings of fact must
include valuation of assets in order to commit
appellate review. In Jones, as here, counsel
for the parties seeking such review had
prepared the findings of fact, conclusion of
law and decree of divorce and had not included,
or attempted to include, values in those
pleadings.
The Supreme Court declined to
10

disturb the property distribution, stating that
such claim had been waived because the party
seeking reversal failed to attempt to include
property values in the findings of fact. Jones
at 1074-75. We agree that the failure to
include property valuations in divorce may, in
some cases, constitute an abuse of discretion
sufficient to require remand for determination
of values. However, when the lack of valuation
results from the complaining parties1 own
draftsmanship and no clear abuse of discretion
is otherwise proven, we will defer to the trial
court's property distribution. Those factors
exist in the case before us and we therefore
affirm as to property and debt division.
Id. at 671
As Justice Zimmerman further elaborated in Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985):
Normally, we would grant the remedy sought
by the wife and remand for findings on the
specific values of the assets. In this case,
however, the wife's attorney prepared the
inadequate findings of fact she challenges on
appeal and the conclusions of law and decree
of divorce, all of which the court entered
without alteration. Counsel for the wife made
no motion to have the trial court amend the
findings to conclude values. See URCP 52(b).
The wife cannot come now, albeit through new
counsel, and complains of her own failure to
include specific property values in the
findings of fact. She has waived that claim.
Id. at 1074-1075.
Unlike the facts in Jones, Mrs. Brown's trial counsel who
prepared the Findings and Order is also her counsel in connection
with her appeal. Mrs. Brown did not make a motion for new trial,
nor make any motion to have the trial court amend the Memorandum,
11

Decision or Findings to address in more detail the retroactive
application issue.

As such, Mrs. Brown is now precluded from

claiming that the Findings of the trial court on the issue of
retroactive application of child support are inadequate.

Point I

of Mrs. Brown's brief is without merit.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT IN A DIVORCE
ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THERE IS
A CLEAR SHOWING OF A MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW
OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION RESULTING IN A
SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR A SERIOUS INEQUITY.
Mrs. Brown contends that the trial court erred in not making
the increased child support award retroactive to the date her
Petition to Modify was filed and, consequently, abused the wide
discretion afforded it in deciding support issues in divorce
actions.

She is incorrect in making that claim.

In order to prevail on this appeal, Mrs. Brown is required to
show that the trial court, in dealing with her request for
retroactive application, misunderstood or misapplied the law,
entered findings not supported by the evidence, or caused a serious
inequity so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

See also

English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977); Davis v. Davisf
749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1938); Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah
App. 1988); Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988); Jackman
v. Jackman. 696 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1985).
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As was clearly stated in Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah,
1974).:
Although it is both the duty and prerogative
of this court in a case of equity to review the
facts as well as the law, Article 8, Section
9, Constitution of Utah, the trial judge has
considerable
latitude of discretion
in
adjusting the financial and property interests
in a divorce case. The actions of the trialcourt are indulged with the presumption of
validity, and the burden is on appellant to
provide such a serious inequity as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion [footnote].
Mrs. Brown's burden is not an easy one and the record does not show
any inequity which would constitute an abuse of discretion by the
trial court. As was stated in Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424
P.2d 190 (1967):
It would lead to intolerable instability of
judgments if this court should assume the
prerogative and accept the responsibility of
merely second guessing a trial judge who has
done a conscientious job of attempting to make
just and equitable allocation of the property
and income of the parties in regard to alimony
and support monies as the trial judge appears
to have done here. It is due to this fact,
taking into consideration the nature of the
trial judge's authority and duty, and his
advantaged position, that in such matters he
is allowed a comparatively wide latitude of
discretion which will not be disturbed in the
absence of clear abuse . . .
Id. at 151.
In this case, not only did the trial court act well within the
judicial discretion afforded it by the appellate courts of Utah,
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but also within the specific statutory discretion afforded it by
the legislature of Utah. Mrs. Brown relies on Section 3 0-3-10.6(2)
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
In April of 1987, the Utah Legislature passed Section 30-310.6 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) which states in pertinent
part as follows:
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or
spousal support under any child support order,
as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on
and after the date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same
attributes and effect of any judgment
of a district court, except as
provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full
faith and credit in this and in any
other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive
modification by this or any other
jurisdiction, except as provided in
Subsection 2.
i
(2) A child or spousal support payment under
a child support order may be modified with
respect to any period during which a petition
for modification is pending, but only from the
date notice of that petition was given to the
obligee, if the obligor is the petition, or to
the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
Id. (Emphasis added)
The critical language of this statute applicable to this case
is found in subsection (2) set forth below:
14

(2) A child or spousal support payment under
a child support order may be modified with
respect to any period during which a petition
for modification is pending.
Id. (Emphasis added)
Inclusion of the word "may" in this statute as opposed to the
word "shall" clearly demonstrates the intent of our legislature to
allow the trial court the flexibility to fashion an overall remedy
which is fair to both parties and which may or may not include
retroactive application.

Such an approach is likewise consistent

with the longstanding discretionary authority granted to trial
courts by the appellate courts an domestic relations cases.
Furthermore, appellant's Brief at page 11 points out that the
statute is new and, indeed did not become effective until January
19, 1988. Even if this Court finds that Mrs. Brown's award should
have been retroactive, law and equity would require it only relate
back to the day the law became effective May 1987.
Furthermore, she states "it should be, and is, the policy of
the court to give retroactive relief" (Appellant's Brief at p. 12.)
The broad statement is made, however, without any authority from
Utah or any other jurisdiction.

To the contrary, the correct

principle of domestic relations law is that a trial court is
afforded a wide latitude of discretion in fashioning remedies to
meet the needs of the parties in a divorce action. Davis v. Davis,
749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988).
15

In the instant case, after a complete trial and the receipt
of 27 exhibits, the trial judge properly weighed all of the factors
related to both parties and fashioned a remedy that would be as
fair

as

possible

to

both

parties

under

the

individual

circumstances. It included, among many other things, a refusal to
make retroactive the increased child support award and a decision
to continue Dr. Brown's alimony obligation until the youngest child
reached majority. Because Mrs. Brown is dissatisfied with only one
aspect of the trial court's decision, she has now requested this
Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on
that single issue.
trial court's

That request is clearly an invasion of the

function as the fact finder and

fashioner of

equitable remedies.
It also sanctions an approach which, if adopted, would result
in the overall disposition of a domestic relations case on a
"piecemeal basis" thereby upsetting and unfairly adjusting an
overall remedy fashioned by the trial court on an issue by issue
basis.

Common sense and reason tell us that all of the issues in

a divorce action are interrelated and once a finalt fair resolution
of those issues has been reached by the trial court, adjusting or
tampering with one, necessarily causes inequities with others.
That is what Mrs. Brown is now requesting this Court to do.
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Succinctly put, the basic flaw in Mrs. Brown's approach is
that she has not shown that there has been any misapplication of
the law or any abuse of discretion which would justify a reversal
of Judge Sawaya's decision on the issue of retroactive application.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL
COURT SUPPORTS THE OVERALL REMEDY
FASHIONED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ORDER
TO REACH A RESOLUTION FAIR TO BOTH
PARTIES.
Mrs. Brown's brief attempts to set forth a detailed summary
of the testimony presented at trial. However, it does not include
all of the evidence presented to Judge Sawaya by both sides. Dr.
Brown would be the first to agree that this litigation has gone on
much too long, but he definitely disagrees that he is responsible
for

such

delay

or

should bear

any

alleged

cost

through a

retroactive award of increased child support.
To the contrary, the record reflects that Mrs. Brown was the
cause of the delay she now blames on Dr. Brown and the judicial
system.

The issues raised in the parties' respective petitions

for modification were settled by an agreement in June of 1984 two
months be-fore the August trial. Consequently, that trial date was
stricken from the calendar. The terms of the June 1984 settlement
agreement were to increase child support to $500.00 per month, per
child and with alimony to continue for only two years at $900 per
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month.

Five months after that agreement was reached, Mrs. Brown,

after receiving without objection to five months' worth of the
increased child support, backed out.

In February 1985, Dr. Brown

sought to enforce the Settlement Agreement (R. 156). The Domestic
Commissioner's Recommendation that the June 4, 1984, settlement be
enforced was rejected by Mrs. Brown (R. 187). The matter was then
presented to Judge Sawaya on April 15, 1985.

He found the

agreement was openly and fairly negotiated, all issues considered
and, therefore, was binding on the parties (R. 191-2 07).

In May

of 1985, Mrs. Brown then appealed Judge Sawaya's decision (R. 217)
to this Court and an opinion was issued in October of 1987,
reversing Judge Sawaya and remanding the matter back to the trial
court for trial. The parties then conducted additional discovery
and a full trial on the merits was held on October 19, 1988. Judge
Sawaya's decision was once again not to Mrs. Brown's satisfaction
and she has now appealed to this court a second time but only as
to one issue —

retroactive application.

The chain of events makes clear that it is Mrs. Brown own
behavior and inability to accept any court's decision that has
prolonged this litigation, not any acts by Dr. Brown, nor failures
of the judicial system.
It is important to note that Mrs. Brown's avoidance of the
original June 5, 1984, Settlement Agreement cost Dr. Brown an
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August 1984 trial date. At this trial, he was seeking to terminate
his alimony

obligation

entirely.

What ultimately

happened,

however, is Mrs. Brown's alimony continued for four and one-half
more years until Dr. Brown could be heard at the October 1988
trial.
Furthermore, Mrs. Brown argues that Judge Sawaya's decision
denying retroactive affect to her increased child support is
intended to "teach her a lesson . . . [that] it will not be
beneficial to appeal his decisions."

(Appellant's Brief at 21.)

The facts of this case simply do not bear this out. Mrs. Brown is
actually better off as a result of this second trial than she was
under Judge Sawaya's original ruling upholding the June 1984
Settlement Agreement. Under the Stipulation, Mrs. Brown's alimony
would have terminated in two years (1986).

Judge Sawaya's latest

ruling, however, not only allowed Mrs. Brown's alimony for two
years after the date of the Stipulation and until the time of the
1988 trial, but also ten years beyond the date of trial. Clearly,
she received far more generous treatment as a result of the 1988
trial rather than the "punishment" she claims she received by Judge
Sawaya.
Mrs. Brown further alleges that Judge Sawaya's award of
$500.00 per child in child support, was an arbitrary increase
unsupported by any evidence presented at trial.

19

That is not so.

In view of the Court's findings of a 40% increase in Dr. Brown's
income, the increase in support from $300.00 to $500.00 is a
reasonable award. Dr. Brown testified that he felt the $500.00 per
month per child figure was reasonable (Tr. 151) and Mrs. Brown must
be of the same opinion in that she has not claimesd that the trial
court abused its discretion in increasing the child support to the
level it did.
Mrs. Brown spends a great deal of time in her Brief comparing
and contrasting how Dr. Brown and Mrs. Brown's lifestyles have
changed in the nine years since their divorce.

Although this

unfortunately may be the case, it is more important to note the
faithfulness with which Dr. Brown has- fulfilled all monetary
commitments to his ex-wife and children.

He paid every amount he

has been ordered to pay and much more for his children's benefit.
He has paid Mrs. Brown 100% of his daughter Charisse's child
support for the eight months while she was living at his home. For
three more months, pursuant to a stipulation, he continued to pay
Mrs. Brown one-half of his support obligations for Charisse even
though she continued to live with him.
Simply put, the thrust of Mrs. Brown's Brief is that Dr. Brown
should pay her an additional $3 3,600, plus interest because Dr.
Brown makes more money than she does and she feels Dr. Brown can
afford to pay it. A careful reading of her Brief shows that it is
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not a presentation of legal arguments in support of the issue
attempted to be raised, but rather an emotional request that a
substantial lump sum cash award be given to Mrs. Brown.
Mrs. Brown has not appealed the adequacy of the child support
award, but only the question of retroactive application of the
increase.

In so doing, it also becomes clear that she is simply

indirectly seeking the additional increase in child support she did
not receive directly from the trial court.
A simple increase in salary on the part of the non-custodial
parent is not a sufficient basis in and of itself to automatically
increase a child support obligation nor to justify a retroactive
application of any increase in support that might be made.
Our Supreme Court has held in the case of Owen v. Owen, 579
P.2d 912, (Utah 1978), when reviewing a modification of support,
that;
The issue for the court adjudicate was the
needs of the children and not necessarily the
manner and standard of living desired by the
plaintiff.
While an increase of the defendant's income is
certainly an important factor to consider, this
proposition is also true, the fact that a man
may so use his abilities as to increase his
income should not necessarily impose a penalty
upon him by automatically increasing his
obligation under a divorce decree.
Id at 913.
In this case, the trial court considered evidence on the needs
21

of the children; the earnings of each of the parties; the abilities
of each party to earn; and the increases in income of both parties
since the original Decree; Dr. Brown's request to terminate alimony
in its entirety; Mrs. Brown's needs; Mrs. Brown's request for
increased child support; her request for retroactive application
of any increased award; the fact that child support would continue
for each child until age 21 if each child was enrolled in school;
and Mrs. Brown's request for attorney's fees.
After considering all of that evidence, the trial court
fashioned a remedy which it felt was fair to both parties. As was
stated in Point II of this Brief, it is the trial court that has
all of the evidence presented to it listens to the parties,
observes their demeanor and then shapes a resolution that is not
a windfall to either but fair to both.

That is what the trial

court did in this case in connection with refusing to make the
child

support

award retroactive

and that decision

should be

affirmed in all respects.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Brown claims error with the Findings, but she prepared
them and did not request any alteration of them.

She also claims

the trial court should have retroactively increased child support
based on a statute passed four years after her petition was filed.
This statute affords the trial court the right to increase support
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retroactively but by no means mandates it.
In this case, Mrs. Brown's sole issue on appeal is whether or
not the trial court erred in not ordering the increased child
support award to be retroactive to the date the petition was filed,
to wit:

February 1983 (the statute didn't even become law until

May, 1987). Mrs. Brown urged retroactive application to the trial
court and based upon the broad discretion afforded it both under
case law and the specific discretion set forth in the statute,
decided it would be inappropriate to grant her request considering
all of the evidence that had been presented. Therefore, Mrs. Brown
has no basis to claim error by the trial court.

The entire tenor

of Mrs. Brown's Brief is but a plea for sympathy not based on the
law or logic. The trial court's decision should be affirmed in all
respects and Dr. Brown should be awarded his costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of September, 1989.
DART, ADAMSON

/KENT M. KAS-J
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendan^Jfespondent
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFfS PETITION
FOR MODIFICATION AND ON
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERPETITION
FOR MODIFICATION

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. D79-3802

BRYANT JEROME BROWN,

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.

THE MATTER of plaintiff's and defendant's petition and
counter-petition for modification of the decree of divorce came
on for trial before the Honorable James S. Sawaya on October
18th, 1988 at the hour of 10:00 a.m.
Plaintiff appeared personally and through her attorney of
record, David A. McPhie.

Defendant appeared personally and

through his attorney of record, Bert L. Dart.
The matters of the petition and counter-petition were
fully presented, including evidence and argument.

The court's

decision was taken under advisement.
Having
authorities

and

fully

considered

memorandums

publishes the following as its

of

the
the

pleadings,

exhibits,

parties, the

court now

FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds that there has been a material change of
circumstances since the entry of the decree of divorce in this
matter.
the

The court finds that those changes are twofold, in that

plaintiff

is

now

employed

and

earning

approximately

$14,000.00 annually; whereas, at the time of the decree, she was
unemployed, having no income.

Further, that the defendant has

income potential exceeding $100,000.00 annually; whereas, his
income potential at the time of the decree was approximately
$70,000.00 per year.
Based

upon

circumstances, the

the

foregoing

court makes

finding

the

of

following

a

change

order

of

on said

petitions:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The

alimony

previously

ordered

in the decree of

divorce, in the sum of $900.00 per month, shall continue at that
rate.

Further, that said alimony shall terminate at the time the

youngest child of the parties attains the age of majority.
2.

The child support obligation of the defendant to the

plaintiff is hereby increased from the sum of $300.00 per month,
per child, to the sum of $500.00 per month, per child.

It is

further ordered that the child support paid for the oldest child
of the parties, Cherise, who is now age

18, shall be paid

directly to her, since she has attained the age of majority.
court

further

orders

that

the
2

child

support

The

for any child

attaining the age of majority be paid directly to that child,
pursuant to the provisions of the original decree, providing for
continued support to any child of the parties to age 21 years, if
that child elects to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or
elects to attend a college or university.
3.

The

plaintiff's

request

that

her

petition

for

modification be granted retroactive to the date of filing of that
petition is denied.
4.

The plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees in the sum

of $5,000.00, which the court determines to be reasonable under
the facts and circumstances of the proceedings, together with the
costs reasonably incurred in processing and proceeding with her
petition.
5.

The defendant's counter-petition, seeking increased

visitation with the parties children, is granted to allow the
defendant a period of six weeks during the summer months.

The

visitation of the defendant with the minor children, however,
shall be based otherwise on the same terms and conditions as in
the original decree of divorce.
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tionality for the Board to conclude: (1) that
Robinson's mental illness was not sufficiently within his control; and (2) that any
exacerbation of his mental problems from
his use of marijuana did not rise to the
level of fault essential to establish just
cause and deny him unemployment benefits.
We affirm the decision of the Board of
Review. In doing so, we reiterate that,
although Champlin may have had reason to
remove Robinson from his unsupervised operator position because of his mental problems, "not every cause for discharge provides a basis to deny eligibility for unemployment compensation." Clearfield City
v. Department of Employment
Sec, 663
P.2d 440, 441 (Utah 1983). Accord Board
of Educ. of Sevier County v. Board of
Review, 701 P.2d at 1068.
BENCH and GARFF, JJ„ concur.

Divorce <^236, 297
Putative stipulation providing for reduced alimony and increased child support,
that was neither signed by ex-wife nor read
into record before judge, did not meet requirements for valid binding agreement;
neither ex-wife's failure to object to agreement nor her acceptance of increased child
support payments constituted assent to
agreement so as to estop her from challenging its validity. U.C.A.1953, 25-5-4;
District and Circuit Courts Practice Rule
4.5(b).

David A. McPhie, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
B.L. Dart, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and respondent.
Before DAVIDSON, GREENWOOD
and ORME, J J.
DAVIDSON, Judge:

I UV NUM8£RSYST£M>

Carol Ann Barker BROWN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Bryant Jerome BROWN, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 860125-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 21, 1987.

Ex-wife appealed from order of the
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S
Sawaya, J., enforcing agreement modifying
decree of divorce. The Court of Appeals,
Davidson, J., held that putative stipulation
did not meet requirements for valid binding
agreement.
Reversed.
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Plaintiff appeals from an order relative
to the modification of a decree of divorce
which treated a putative stipulation as dispositive of all issues. We reverse and remand.
The parties were married on June 4,
1969. Three children were born to the
Browns; all of whom are still minors at the
time of this appeal. Defendant is a physician with a practice located in Salt Lake
City. Plaintiff possesses a bachelor's degree and was not employed at the time of
divorce. The amended decree of divorce
was signed on February 21, 1980. The
salient provisions were: plaintiff would
have custody of the children subject to
specified visitation rights; defendant would
pay child support in the amount of $300.00
per child per month for a total of $900.00
per month; defendant would pay $900.00
per month as alimony which would cease if
plaintiff remarried or cohabited with a
male; and plaintiff would not be able to
seek an increase in support or alimony for
36 months after the date of the decree.
On March 1, 1983, plaintiff filed a petition for modification of the decree of divorce which was based on a significant
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increase in defendant's gross income and a
material change in plaintiffs circumstances. The two most important requests for
modification were for increases in alimony
and child support to $1,500.00 per month
and $500.00 per child per month, respectively. -Defendant counterpetitioned for termination of alimony and for expanded visitation rights.
During the next fifteen months discovery
and settlement negotiations took place.
Plaintiffs deposition was scheduled for
June 5, 1984, in preparation for a trial set
for August 14, 1984. Apparently plaintiffs counsel caused opposing counsel to
believe that the issues had been resolved
satisfactorily and that the time scheduled
for the taking of plaintiffs deposition could
be used to record the agreement. The parties and their respective counsel met on the
scheduled date and recorded the agreement
at issue before a certified shorthand reporter. In addition to visitation arrangements,
the agreement provided that, commencing
July 1984, alimony would be reduced from
$900.00 per month to $500.00 per month
and would continue for two years at the
lower level before terminating. Child support was increased from $300.00 per child
per month to $500.00 per child per month
with conditions specified when such support would also terminate. The record indicates that both counsel and defendant
spoke but that plaintiff said nothing during
the proceedings. The agreement was subsequently reduced to writing and sent to
plaintiffs counsel. Beginning in July 1984,
defendant began paying the total amount
set forth in the agreement, which payments
were accepted by plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that she was not given
a copy of the written agreement until August 2984. She immediately attempted to
consult with her counsel but was unable to
see him until late in September. At that
meeting, plaintiff stated that she believed
the agreement to be unfair and refused to
sign it. Her counsel withdrew on November 7, 1984.
On February 14, 1985, defendant filed a
motion for an order approving and enforcing the settlement agreement. On Febru-

ary 25, 1935, plaintiff filed an affidavit
which stated that her former counsel had
assured her that increases in alimony and
child support were justified and that he
was confident she would win major increases in both; that she was unaware of the
tenor of the proposed settlement agreement until the day scheduled for her deposition; that her former counsel informed
her that he told opposing counsel that she
would agree to the settlement; that she
was "shocked, dismayed, dissapointed [sic],
and confused" by her counsel's change in
position; that she didn't recall speaking at
the proceeding; and that she refused to
sign the written agreement. A hearing on
defendant's motion was held before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner in March
1985, who recommended that the motion be
granted. Plaintiff rejected the recommendation and the motion was argued in Third
District Court in April. The order enforcing the agreement was filed on May 1,
1985, and plaintiff timely filed her notice of
appeal. The issue is whether or not the
trial court should have accepted and enforced the proceedings of June 5, 1984, as a
stipulation between the parties.
It is necessary to begin by looking at
what constitutes a "stipulation".
A promise or agreement with reference
to a pending judicial proceeding, made by
a party to the proceeding or his attorney,
is binding without consideration. By
statute or rule of court such an agreement is generally binding only (a) if it is
in writing and signed by the party or
attorney, or (b) if it is made or admitted
in the presence of the court, or (c) to the
extent that justice requires enforcement
in view of material change of position in
reliance on the promise or agreement.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94
(1981).
Further,
It has been said that unless it is clear
from the record that the parties assented, there is no stipulation, and it is provided in many jurisdictions, by rule of
court or by statute, that a private agreement or consent between the parties or
their attorneys, in respect to the proceed-
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ings in a cause, will not be enforced by
the court unless it is evidenced by a
writing subscribed by the party against
whom it is alleged or made, and filed by
the clerk or entered upon the minutes of
the court. Any other rule would require
the court to pass upon the credibility of
the attorneys.
73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 2 (1974)
(footnote omitted).
Utah R.Prac.D. & C.Ct. 4.5(b) requires
that "[n]o orders, judgments or decrees
upon stipulation shall be signed or entered
unless such stipulation is in writing, signed
by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk, provided that the stipulation may be made orally
in open court." There can be little doubt
the rule of practice is concerned with the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds as
expressed in Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4
(1984)f which states that certain agreements are void unless in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith. The Statute of Frauds was not interposed as an affirmative defense below.2
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting
of the minds of those involved. The parties
must have completed their negotiations either in person or through their attorneys
acting within the rules of agency. The
agreement then is reduced to writing,
signed and filed with the clerk or read into
the record before the court This procedure would indicate obvious assent to the
provisions of the agreement so stipulated.
Not so here.
This agreement was reached between
one of the parties and both counsel. Mrs.
Brown remained silent while it was discussed and read into the record. The proceeding was not done in court as would be
permitted by Rule 4.5(b) but was done at
the time of a deposition before a shorthand
1» § 25-5-4: Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is
in writing subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed within one year from the
making thereof.

reporter. Had it been done in court a
judge would have been involved and would
have made inquiry of the parties, likely
while they were both under oath, if they
understood and agreed with the terms.
Had Mrs. Brown remained silent in that
scenario it is hard to imagine the court
finding agreement. The same conclusion is
compelled here. Silence cannot be construed to be assent in these circumstances.
For a stipulation to be binding, agreement
by the parties must be evidenced by a
signed writing which would satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, or the agreement must
be stated in court on the record before a
judge. The facts in this case do not show
such evidence. Therefore, there was no
stipulation reached between the parties and
there is nothing for the court to enforce.
Defendant argues that plaintiff made no
timely objection to the agreement and accepted the additional $200.00 per month
from him; thus she should be estopped
from denying its validity. It is easily understood why plaintiff accepted the increased payments. She was confused as to
her position, unsure of what her counsel
might do next, and the payments appear to
have been her sole means of support Any
refusal to accept might have resulted in a
delay or cessation of support or increased
delays in determining the status of defendant's obligations. We have already discussed the time delays plaintiff experienced
in obtaining an appointment with her counsel after she first read the written agreement These facts are insufficient to impute a timeliness issue in accordance with
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah
1975). Neither do these facts give rise to
estoppel. We will not go around the Statute of Frauds and Rule 4.5(b) to create a
stipulation on the mere acceptance of
. Certainly a stipulation setting terms for payment of alimony and child support would fall
within the Statute of Frauds since such an
agreement would not be performed within one
year from the making. The putative stipulation
here would run for many years with changes to
occur at stated intervals.
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$200.00 per month by plaintiff.3 Whether
she is entitled to retain the extra payments
or will be required to credit defendant shall
be determined by the trial court on remand.
In summary, we hold that the putative
stipulation of June 5, 1984, fails to meet
the requirements of a valid stipulation as
stated above. The order enforcing the
agreement is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further action
on plaintiffs original petition for modification. Costs against defendant.
GREENWOOD, J., concurs.
ORME, Judge: (dissenting)
I think what is said in the main opinion
about the requirements for a binding stipulation is correct. I agree the requirements
for a valid stipulation were not met in this
case. However, there are situations where
a settlement agreement is reached—where
all parties have had a meeting of the minds
as to the basis for settlement of an action
or proceeding—through a device other than
a stipulation. That agreement might be
memorialized by an exchange of letters,
dictation to a shorthand reporter, or even
just a handshake. In my view, such agreements, intended to be binding when made,
are enforceable and should be enforced.
They should be enforced even though one
party might have a change of heart or
otherwise balk at signing a formal stipulation designed to implement the valid and
binding agreement previously made. Parties have no right to welch on a settlement
deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the deal is struck and
when all necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation.
The key in this case, then, is whether
appellant assented to the settlement agreement which was dictated to the reporter in
her presence. She concededly sat mute
throughout the proceeding. Her duly employed attorney, however, manifested assent on her behalf. The pivotal issue is
whether he had authority to do so.
3. The evidence shows this defendant to be earning a substantial income. The additional
$200.00 per month paid on this putative stipula-

The facts are in conflict on this point.
Appellant suggests she was stupefied by
her former attorney's betrayal and rendered unable to speak or, apparently, even
to storm out. On the other hand, it is
reasonable to infer, as those present did,
that a principal who says nothing when her
agent speaks for her is in accord with the
sentiments expressed by the agent. This
inference is bolstered by evidence which is
usually quite reliable—the subsequent
course of conduct of the parties. Following the apparent agreement, respondent
made payment at the higher level contemplated by the putative settlement and for
several months appellant accepted those
payments without incident. No unfavorable inference would be available from her
merely cashing the checks, which were
mostly for amounts clearly due her. But
her retention and use of the extra amount
not due her under the original decree is
consistent only with an understanding that
a settlement had been reached—or, I suppose, of dishonesty on her part. Laypersons fully understand that they may spend
money only if it is theirs. There being
nothing to suggest appellant was dishonest, the fact that she kept the extra amount
rather than returning it tends to show she
thought it was hers to keep; it could be
hers to keep only if the decree were modified, as per the settlement, to increase the
monthly total due for her support and that
of the children. Thus, her retention and
use of the larger payments tendered subsequent to the alleged settlement tends to
show she had agreed to the terms of the
settlement.
The facts concerning whether appellant
assented to the settlement would support a
conclusion either way. After hearing the
motion to enforce the settlement, which a
commissioner earlier heard and recommended be granted, the trial court made
findings of fact to the effect that appellant
was bound by the settlement I concede,
however, that those findings are not entitled to the usual deference because the
court did not receive actual testimony. Cf.
tion represents no hardship and no material
change of circumstances on his part.
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Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American
Savings & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133,1136 (Utah
Ct.App.1987).1 The court received affidavits and counsels' representations about
what the testimony would show. Thus, the
trial court's usual advantage in terms of
viewing the witnesses and their demeanor
does not obtain in this case. We are in as
good a position to review the affidavits and
consider the proffer2 as was the trial
court.3 After considering these items, I
agree with the commissioner and the trial
judge that the facts more readily support
the conclusion that appellant initially
agreed to the settlement and then had a
change of heart than the conclusion that
she never agreed but was rendered unable
to say so and simply regarded the extra
amounts tendered as a coincidental gift
from her ex-husband.
I would affirm.
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Myrna I. MARTIN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Richard G. MOTT, et al., Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 860103-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 22, 1987.
Patient brought medical malpractice
action against podiatrist in which she alleged that podiatrist failed to properly diagnose and treat her condition. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Philip R.
Fishier, J., granted podiatrist's motion for
summary judgment and patient appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that
medical doctor who was acting as expert
for patient was unfamiliar with standard of
care applicable to podiatrist, and thus was
not competent to testify as to any breach of
such standard; thus, summary judgment
was appropriate.
Affirmed.
1. Physicians and Surgeons <3=>18.80(7, 8)
In medical malpractice action, unless
within common knowledge and experience

1.

In Diversified Equities, the trial court received
an extensive recitation of facts to which the
parties had stipulated. 739 P.2d at 1134. The
trial court then entered "findings" of fact. We
observed: "Generally, a trial court's findings of
fact are accorded great deference. However,
without regard to the labels used, when those
"findings" proceed from stipulated facts . . . the
"findings" are tantamount to conclusions of law,
with the stipulation of facts being the functional
equivalent of the findings of fact." 739 P.2d at
1136. That conclusion is premised on two
factors: First, a disposition based on stipulated
facts is "not one involving resolution by the trial
court of conflicting testimony." Schroeder v.
Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1979) (en
banc). Second, since the facts are written or
recited and do not turn on witness credibility,
an appellate court has "the same means as the
trial court had of reaching a correct conclusion
of law
" Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794
(Ala. 1980). Those same factors apply to the
affidavits and proffer which substituted for testimony in the instant case. Although the conflict between the affidavits should have prompted an evidentiary hearing, see Note 3, infra, we

are in as good a position as was the trial court
to read the affidavits and the proffer and draw
logical conclusions therefrom.
2.

Fortunately, one of the two attorneys requested that the hearing be reported or the proffer
would be unavailable to us. Such a hearing
should be reported as a matter of course. See
Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct.
App.1987) ("Although consistently making a
record of all proceedings imposes a greater burden on the trial court and court reporters, it is
impossible for an appellate court to review what
may ultimately prove to be important proceedings when no record of them has been made.").

3.

In retrospect, an evidentiary hearing would
probably have been preferable. Had the testimony been consistent with the affidavits and
proffer and the same findings made, those findings would clearly be entitled to the usual deference and the trial court's disposition would
clearly be entitled to affirmance. However, neither side requested an evidentiary hearing and
appellant does not argue on appeal that she was
entitled to one.

